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Grijjy.Scram.pas
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Grijjy.Scram.pas
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unit Grijjy.Scram;
{ Routines for handling Salted Challenge Response Authentication Mechanism (SCRAM) }
{ https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5802
Currently supports SCRAM-SHA-1 and SCRAM-SHA-256 }
{$INCLUDE 'Grijjy.inc'}
interface
uses
System.SysUtils,
Grijjy.System;
const
{ GS2 header }
SCRAM_GS2_HEADER = 'n,,';
type
{ Scram mechanism }
TgoScramMechanism = (SCRAM_SHA_1, SCRAM_SHA_256);
{ Scram authentication helper class }
TgoScram = class
private
FNonce: String;
FScramGs2Header: String;
FMechanism: TgoScramMechanism;
FUsername: String;
FPassword: String;
{ Step 1 }
FClientFirstMsg: String;
FConversationId: Integer;
FServerFirstMsg: String;
FServerNonce, FServerSalt: String;
FServerIterations: Integer;
{ Step 2 }
FSaltedPassword: TBytes;
FAuthMessage: String;
FServerSecondMsg: String;
FActualServerSignature, FExpectedServerSignature: String;
FClientFinalMsg: String;
protected
function PBKDF2(const APassword: TBytes; const ASalt: TBytes; const ACount: Integer;
const AKeylength: Integer): TBytes;
public
constructor Create(const AMechanism: TgoScramMechanism; const AUsername, APassword: String);
destructor Destroy; override;
public
{ Creates the first client to server message }
procedure CreateFirstMsg;
{ Processes the first server to client response message }
procedure HandleServerFirstMsg(const AConversationId: Integer; const AServerFirstMsg: String);
{ Processes the second server to client response message }
procedure HandleServerSecondMsg(const AServerSecondMsg: String);
{ Returns True if the expected server signature matches the actual signature }
function ValidSignature: Boolean;
public
{ Client random nonce }
property Nonce: String read FNonce;
{ Client first message }
property ClientFirstMsg: String read FClientFirstMsg;
{ Client conversation id }
property ConversationId: Integer read FConversationId;
{ Client final message }
property ClientFinalMsg: String read FClientFinalMsg;
end;
implementation
uses
System.Math,
System.Hash,
System.Generics.Collections,
Grijjy.BinaryCoding;
function CreateNonce: String;
var
Index: Integer;
const
Charset: String = '0123456789abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ';
begin
Randomize;
for Index := 0 to 31 do
Result := Result + Charset[Random(62) + 1]; { Note: This is not considered crypto strength, use OpenSsl's Rand() instead }
end;
function SplitString(const AString: String; const ASeparator: array of String): TDictionary<String, String>;
var
Strings: TArray<String>;
S, Key, Value: String;
Index: Integer;
begin
Result := TDictionary<String, String>.Create;
Strings := AString.Split(ASeparator);
for S in Strings do
begin
Index := S.IndexOf('=');
if Index = -1 then
Continue;
Key := S.Substring(0, Index);
Value := S.Substring(Index + 1);
Result.Add(Key, Value);
end;
end;
function BytesToHexString(const ABytes: TBytes): String;
var
I: Integer;
begin
for I := Low(ABytes) to High(ABytes) do
Result := Result + IntToHex(ABytes[I], 2);
end;
procedure XorBytes(var ADestBytes: TBytes; const ASourceBytes: TBytes);
var
I: Integer;
begin
for I := Low(ADestBytes) to High(ADestBytes) do
ADestBytes[I] := ADestBytes[I] xor ASourceBytes[I];
end;
function ConcatenateBytes(const ADestBytes: TBytes; const ASourceBytes: TBytes): TBytes; inline;
begin
SetLength(Result, Length(ADestBytes) + Length(ASourceBytes));
if Length(ADestBytes) > 0 then
Move(ADestBytes[Low(ADestBytes)], Result[Low(Result)], Length(ADestBytes));
if Length(ASourceBytes) > 0 then
Move(ASourceBytes[Low(ASourceBytes)], Result[Low(Result)+Length(ADestBytes)], Length(ASourceBytes));
end;
function SaslPrepPassword(APassword: String): String;
var
I: Integer;
begin
Result := APassword;
for I := 1 to Length(APassword) do
case Word(APassword[I]) of
$00A0, $1680, $2000, $2001, $2002, $2003, $2004, $2005, $2006, $2007, $2008, $2009, $200A, $202F, $205F, $3000:
begin
Result[I] := #$0020;
end;
end;
end;
{ TgoScram }
constructor TgoScram.Create(const AMechanism: TgoScramMechanism; const AUsername, APassword: String);
begin
FMechanism := AMechanism;
FUsername := AUsername;
FPassword := APassword;
FNonce := CreateNonce;
FScramGs2Header := TEncoding.Utf8.GetString(goBase64Encode(TEncoding.Utf8.GetBytes(SCRAM_GS2_HEADER)));
end;
destructor TgoScram.Destroy;
begin
inherited;
end;
function TgoScram.PBKDF2(const APassword: TBytes; const ASalt: TBytes; const ACount: Integer;
const AKeylength: Integer): TBytes;
var
BlockCount: Integer;
I: Int32;
F: TBytes;
U: TBytes;
J: Integer;
T: TBytes;
HashLength: Integer;
function INT_32_BE(const AValue: Int32): TBytes;
begin
Result := TBytes.Create(AValue shr 24, AValue shr 16, AValue shr 8, AValue);
end;
begin
if FMechanism = TgoScramMechanism.SCRAM_SHA_1 then
HashLength := Length(THashSHA1.GetHMACAsBytes('',''))
else
HashLength := Length(THashSHA2.GetHMACAsBytes('',''));
BlockCount := Ceil(AKeylength / HashLength);
for I := 1 to BlockCount do
begin
if FMechanism = TgoScramMechanism.SCRAM_SHA_1 then
F := THashSHA1.GetHMACAsBytes(ConcatenateBytes(ASalt, INT_32_BE(I)), APassword)
else
F := THashSHA2.GetHMACAsBytes(ConcatenateBytes(ASalt, INT_32_BE(I)), APassword);
U := Copy(F);
for J := 2 to ACount do
begin
if FMechanism = TgoScramMechanism.SCRAM_SHA_1 then
U := THashSHA1.GetHMACAsBytes(U, APassword)
else
U := THashSHA2.GetHMACAsBytes(U, APassword);
XorBytes(F, U);
end;
T := ConcatenateBytes(T, F);
end;
Result := Copy(T, Low(T), AKeylength);
end;
procedure TgoScram.CreateFirstMsg;
var
Username: String;
begin
{ Convert username characters so special characters are handled properly within payloads }
Username := FUsername.Replace('=', '=3D').Replace(',', '=2C');
{ Create the string of the client to server first message }
FClientFirstMsg := 'n=' + Username + ',r=' + FNonce;
end;
procedure TgoScram.HandleServerFirstMsg(const AConversationId: Integer;
const AServerFirstMsg: String);
var
ServerMsg: TDictionary<String, String>;
Iterations: String;
SHA1: THashSHA1;
SHA256: THashSHA2;
MD5: THashMD5;
MD5Digest: TBytes;
HashedPassword: String;
ClientFinalNoPf: String;
ClientKey, StoredKey, ClientSignature, ClientProof: TBytes;
begin
FConversationId := AConversationId;
{ ex: r=PbeWTe0x6is8tezKDg44MeIsmVWOD1cis3W4HBsbkZEKSEkj+EEGvJiwNcK11dr5,s=J5P6oNGeHYmVlWE2j5a6tw==,i=10000 }
FServerFirstMsg := AServerFirstMsg;
{ Parse the first server message }
ServerMsg := SplitString(FServerFirstMsg, [',']);
try
ServerMsg.TryGetValue('r', FServerNonce);
ServerMsg.TryGetValue('s', FServerSalt);
ServerMsg.TryGetValue('i', Iterations);
FServerIterations := StrToIntDef(Iterations, 10000);
finally
ServerMsg.Free;
end;
{ Step 2 }
if FMechanism = TgoScramMechanism.SCRAM_SHA_1 then
begin
{ Calculate a hash of the normalized password }
MD5 := THashMD5.Create;
MD5.Update(TEncoding.UTF8.GetBytes(FUsername + ':mongo:' + FPassword));
MD5Digest := MD5.HashAsBytes;
HashedPassword := BytesToHexString(MD5Digest).ToLower;
{ Calculate a Password-Based Key Derivation Function hash of the password using the server provided salt }
FSaltedPassword := PBKDF2(TEncoding.Utf8.GetBytes(HashedPassword),
goBase64Decode(TEncoding.Utf8.GetBytes(FServerSalt)),
FServerIterations,
20);
end
else
begin
{ Calculate a Password-Based Key Derivation Function hash of the password using the server provided salt }
FSaltedPassword := PBKDF2(TEncoding.Utf8.GetBytes(SaslPrepPassword(FPassword)),
goBase64Decode(TEncoding.Utf8.GetBytes(FServerSalt)),
FServerIterations,
32);
end;
{ Create the client final no proof
Note that biws is a constant and is the just the GS2 header string 'n,,' Base64 encoded }
{ ex: "c=biws,r=fyko+d2lbbFgONRv9qkxdawLHo+Vgk7qvUOKUwuWLIWg4l/9SraGMHEE" }
ClientFinalNoPf := 'c=' + FScramGs2Header + ',r=' + FServerNonce;
{ ex: "n=user,r=fyko+d2lbbFgONRv9qkxdawL,r=fyko+d2lbbFgONRv9qkxdawLHo+Vgk7qvUOKUwuWLIWg4l/9SraGMHEE,s=rQ9ZY3MntBeuP3E1TDVC4w==,i=10000,c=biws,r=fyko+d2lbbFgONRv9qkxdawLHo+Vgk7qvUOKUwuWLIWg4l/9SraGMHEE" }
FAuthMessage := FClientFirstMsg + ',' + FServerFirstMsg + ',' + ClientFinalNoPf;
{ The string 'Client Key' is also constant and is used as a default message to be hashed by the (salted) password }
{ ex: 6e ca 60 b8 b0 46 77 1f c7 17 40 92 de 6e 7e 83 78 59 b3 56 }
if FMechanism = TgoScramMechanism.SCRAM_SHA_1 then
ClientKey := THashSHA1.GetHMACAsBytes('Client Key', FSaltedPassword)
else
ClientKey := THashSHA2.GetHMACAsBytes('Client Key', FSaltedPassword);
{ ex: a7 9c fa 9f b5 2d a9 ff a9 2c 19 1a 78 99 38 4f 77 81 38 e0 }
if FMechanism = TgoScramMechanism.SCRAM_SHA_1 then
begin
SHA1 := THashSHA1.Create;
SHA1.Update(ClientKey);
StoredKey := SHA1.HashAsBytes;
end
else
begin
SHA256 := THashSHA2.Create;
SHA256.Update(ClientKey);
StoredKey := SHA256.HashAsBytes;
end;
{ ex: 5e e7 f3 48 ab 9d ee 7b 9b 87 7c ae 7f 07 07 a2 20 78 73 70 }
if FMechanism = TgoScramMechanism.SCRAM_SHA_1 then
ClientSignature := THashSHA1.GetHMACAsBytes(FAuthMessage, StoredKey)
else
ClientSignature := THashSHA2.GetHMACAsBytes(FAuthMessage, StoredKey);
{ ex: 30 2d 93 f0 1b db 99 64 5c 90 3c 3c a1 69 79 21 58 21 c0 26 }
ClientProof := ClientKey;
XorBytes(ClientProof, ClientSignature);
{ ex: "c=biws,r=fyko+d2lbbFgONRv9qkxdawLHo+Vgk7qvUOKUwuWLIWg4l/9SraGMHEE,p=MC2T8BvbmWRckDw8oWl5IVghwCY=" }
FClientFinalMsg := ClientFinalNoPf + ',p=' + TEncoding.Utf8.GetString(goBase64Encode(ClientProof));
end;
procedure TgoScram.HandleServerSecondMsg(const AServerSecondMsg: String);
var
ServerMsg: TDictionary<String, String>;
ServerKey: TBytes;
begin
FServerSecondMsg := AServerSecondMsg;
{ Now it is our chance to validate the server and check that it also knows the user's password.
Note the string "Server Key" is constant and is used as a default message to be hashed by the (salted) password. }
ServerMsg := SplitString(FServerSecondMsg, [',']);
try
ServerMsg.TryGetValue('v', FActualServerSignature);
finally
ServerMsg.Free;
end;
{ ex: 95 1a d5 1f 2a 8c 5f e3 8e a8 6b e9 72 fb fd 6a 79 40 f0 84 }
if FMechanism = TgoScramMechanism.SCRAM_SHA_1 then
ServerKey := THashSHA1.GetHMACAsBytes('Server Key', FSaltedPassword)
else
ServerKey := THashSHA2.GetHMACAsBytes('Server Key', FSaltedPassword);
{ The actual and expected signature should match }
{ ex: "UMWeI25JD1yNYZRMpZ4VHvhZ9e0=" }
if FMechanism = TgoScramMechanism.SCRAM_SHA_1 then
FExpectedServerSignature := TEncoding.Utf8.GetString(goBase64Encode(THashSHA1.GetHMACAsBytes(FAuthMessage, ServerKey)))
else
FExpectedServerSignature := TEncoding.Utf8.GetString(goBase64Encode(THashSHA2.GetHMACAsBytes(FAuthMessage, ServerKey)));
end;
function TgoScram.ValidSignature: Boolean;
begin
Result := FExpectedServerSignature = FActualServerSignature;
end;
end.