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draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile.xml
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draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile.xml
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<?xml version='1.0' encoding='utf-8'?>
<!DOCTYPE rfc>
<?xml-stylesheet type='text/xsl' href='rfc2629.xslt' ?>
<?rfc strict="yes" ?>
<?rfc toc="yes"?>
<?rfc tocdepth="4"?>
<?rfc symrefs="yes"?>
<?rfc sortrefs="yes" ?>
<?rfc compact="yes" ?>
<?rfc subcompact="no" ?>
<rfc xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude"
category="std"
docName="draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile-18"
ipr="trust200902"
consensus="true"
submissionType="IETF">
<front>
<title abbrev="RPKI ASPA Profile">
A Profile for Autonomous System Provider Authorization
</title>
<author fullname="Alexander Azimov" initials="A" surname="Azimov">
<organization>Yandex</organization>
<address>
<email>[email protected]</email>
</address>
</author>
<author fullname="Eugene Uskov" initials="E" surname="Uskov">
<organization>JetLend</organization>
<address>
<email>[email protected]</email>
</address>
</author>
<author fullname="Randy Bush" initials="R" surname="Bush">
<organization>Internet Initiative Japan</organization>
<address>
<email>[email protected]</email>
</address>
</author>
<author fullname="Job Snijders" initials="J." surname="Snijders">
<organization>Fastly</organization>
<address>
<postal>
<street/>
<city>Amsterdam</city>
<code/>
<country>NL</country>
</postal>
<email>[email protected]</email>
</address>
</author>
<author fullname="Russ Housley" initials="R" surname="Housley">
<organization abbrev="Vigil Security">Vigil Security, LLC</organization>
<address>
<postal>
<street>918 Spring Knoll Drive</street>
<city>Herndon</city>
<region>VA</region>
<code>20170</code>
<country>USA</country>
</postal>
<email>[email protected]</email>
</address>
</author>
<author fullname="Ben Maddison" initials="B" surname="Maddison">
<organization abbrev="Workonline">Workonline</organization>
<address>
<postal>
<street/>
<city>Cape Town</city>
<country>South Africa</country>
</postal>
<email>[email protected]</email>
</address>
</author>
<date/>
<keyword>BGP</keyword>
<keyword>Route leak</keyword>
<keyword>Hijacks</keyword>
<abstract>
<t>
This document defines a Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) protected content type for Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA) objects for use with the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI).
An ASPA is a digitally signed object through which the issuer (the holder of an Autonomous System identifier), can authorize one or more other Autonomous Systems (ASes) as its upstream providers.
When validated, an ASPA's eContent can be used for detection and mitigation of route leaks.
</t>
</abstract>
<note title="Requirements Language">
<t>
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 <xref target="RFC2119"/> <xref target="RFC8174"/> when, and
only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.
</t>
</note>
</front>
<middle>
<section title="Introduction" anchor="intro">
<t>
The primary purpose of the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is to improve routing security <xref target="RFC6480"/>.
As part of this infrastructure, a mechanism is needed to facilitate holders of Autonomous System (AS) identifiers in their capacity as Customer to authorize other ASes as their Provider(s).
A Provider AS (PAS) is a network that:
<list style="letters">
<t>offers its customers outbound (customer to Internet) data traffic connectivity and/or</t>
<t>further propagates in all directions (towards providers, lateral peers, and customers) any BGP Updates that the customer may send.</t>
</list>
The digitally signed Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA) object described in this document provides the above-mentioned authorization mechanism.
</t>
<t>
An ASPA object is a cryptographically verifiable attestation signed by the holder of an Autonomous System identifier (hereafter called the "Customer AS", or CAS).
An ASPA contains a list of one or more ASes, each listing meaning the listed AS is authorized to act as Provider network.
When the CAS has multiple Providers, all Provider ASes are listed in the ASPA, including any non-transparent Internet Exchange Point (IXP) Route Server (RS) ASes.
The common case for RS ASes at IXPs is to operate transparently (see Section 2.2.2.1 <xref target="RFC7947"/>), and in those instances the ASNs of IXP Route Servers are not listed as PAS in ASPAs.
</t>
<t>
The BGP Roles that an Autonomous System (AS) may have in its peering relationships with eBGP neighbors are discussed in <xref target="I-D.ietf-sidrops-aspa-verification"/>.
The details of ASPA registration requirements for ASes in different scenarios are also specified in that document.
In addition, the procedures for verifying AS_PATHs in BGP UPDATE messages using Validated ASPA Payloads (VAPs) are described in that document.
</t>
<t>
This CMS <xref target="RFC5652"/> protected content type definition conforms to the <xref target="RFC6488"/> template for RPKI signed objects.
In accordance with Section 4 of <xref target="RFC6488"/>, this document defines:
<list style="numbers">
<t>
The object identifier (OID) that identifies the ASPA signed object.
This OID appears in the eContentType field of the encapContentInfo object as well as the content-type signed attribute within the signerInfo structure.
</t>
<t>
The ASN.1 syntax for the ASPA content, which is the payload signed by the CAS.
The ASPA content is encoded using the ASN.1 <xref target="X.680"/> Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER) <xref target="X.690"/>.
</t>
<t>
The steps required to validate an ASPA beyond the validation steps specified in <xref target="RFC6488"/>.
</t>
</list>
</t>
</section>
<section title="ASPA Content Type" anchor="content-type">
<t>
The content-type for an ASPA is defined as id-ct-ASPA, which has the numerical value of 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.49.
This OID MUST appear both within the eContentType in the encapContentInfo structure as well as the content-type signed attribute within the signerInfo structure (see <xref target="RFC6488"/>).
</t>
</section>
<section title="ASPA eContent" anchor="content">
<t>
The content of an ASPA identifies the Customer AS (CAS) as well as the Set of Provider ASes (SPAS) that are authorized by the CAS to be its Providers.
</t>
<t>
A user registering ASPA(s) must be cognizant of Sections 2, 3, and 4 of <xref target="I-D.ietf-sidrops-aspa-verification"/> and the user (or their software tool) must comply with the ASPA registration recommendations in Section 4 of that document.
</t>
<t>
It is highly recommended that for a given Customer AS, a single ASPA object be maintained which contains all providers, including any non-transparent RS ASes.
Such a practice helps prevent race conditions during ASPA updates.
Otherwise, said race conditions might affect route propagation.
The software that provides hosting for ASPA records SHOULD support enforcement of this recommendation.
In the case of the transition process between different CA registries, the ASPA records SHOULD be kept identical in all registries in terms of their authorization contents.
</t>
<t>
The eContent of an ASPA is an instance of ASProviderAttestation, formally defined by the following ASN.1 <xref target="X.680"/> module:
</t>
<sourcecode type="asn.1" src="RPKI-ASPA-2023.asn"/>
<t>
Note that this content appears as the eContent within the encapContentInfo as specified in <xref target="RFC6488"/>.
</t>
<section title="version">
<t>
The version number of the ASProviderAttestation that complies with this specification MUST be 1 and MUST be explicitly encoded.
</t>
</section>
<section title="customerASID">
<t>
The customerASID field contains the AS number of the Customer Autonomous System that is the authorizing entity.
</t>
</section>
<section title="providers">
<t>
The providers field contains the listing of ASes that are authorized as providers.
</t>
<t>
Each element contained in the providers field is an instance of ASID.
Each ASID element contains the AS number of an AS that has been authorized by the customer AS as its provider or RS.
</t>
<t>
In addition to the constraints described by the formal ASN.1 definition, the contents of the providers field MUST satisfy the following constraints:
<list style="symbols">
<t>
The CustomerASID value MUST NOT appear in any ASID in the providers field.
</t>
<t>
The elements of providers MUST be ordered in ascending numerical order.
</t>
<t>
Each value of ASID MUST be unique (with respect to the other elements of providers).
</t>
</list>
</t>
</section>
</section>
<section title="ASPA Validation" anchor="validation">
<t>
Before a relying party can use an ASPA to validate a routing announcement, the relying party MUST first validate the ASPA object itself.
To validate an ASPA, the relying party MUST perform all the validation checks specified in <xref target="RFC6488"/> as well as the following additional ASPA-specific validation steps.
<list style="symbols">
<t>
The Autonomous System Identifier Delegation Extension <xref target="RFC3779"/> MUST be present in the end-entity (EE) certificate (contained within the ASPA), and the Customer ASID in the ASPA eContent MUST be contained within the set of AS numbers specified by the EE certificate's Autonomous System Identifier Delegation Extension.
</t>
<t>
The EE certificate's Autonomous System Identifier Delegation Extension MUST NOT contain any "inherit" elements.
</t>
<t>
The IP Address Delegation Extension <xref target="RFC3779"/> MUST be absent.
</t>
</list>
</t>
</section>
<section anchor="IANA" title="IANA Considerations">
<section title="SMI Security for S/MIME Module Identifier registry">
<t>
Please add the id-mod-rpki-aspa-2023 to the SMI Security for S/MIME Module Identifier (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.0) registry (https://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-numbers/smi-numbers.xml#security-smime-0) as follows:
</t>
<figure>
<artwork type="text">
Decimal | Description | Specification
-----------------------------------------------------------
TBD2 | id-mod-rpki-aspa-2023 | [RFC-to-be]
</artwork>
</figure>
</section>
<section title="SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type registry">
<t>
Please add the ASPA to the SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1) registry (https://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-numbers/smi-numbers.xml#security-smime-1) as follows:
</t>
<figure>
<artwork type="text">
Decimal | Description | Specification
-----------------------------------------------------------
49 | id-ct-ASPA | [RFC-to-be]
</artwork>
</figure>
</section>
<section title="RPKI Signed Object registry">
<t>
Please add Autonomous System Provider Authorization to the RPKI Signed Object registry (https://www.iana.org/assignments/rpki/rpki.xhtml#signed-objects) as follows:
</t>
<figure>
<artwork type="text">
Name | OID | Specification
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Autonomous System Provider Authorization | 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.49 | [RFC-to-be]
</artwork>
</figure>
</section>
<section title="RPKI Repository Name Scheme registry">
<t>
Please add an item for the Autonomous System Provider Authorization file extension to the "RPKI Repository Name Scheme" registry created by <xref target="RFC6481"/> as follows:
</t>
<figure>
<artwork>
<![CDATA[
Filename
Extension RPKI Object Reference
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
.asa Autonomous System Provider Authorization [RFC-to-be]
]]>
</artwork>
</figure>
</section>
<section title="Media Type registry">
<t>
The IANA is requested to register the media type application/rpki-aspa in the "Media Type" registry as follows:
</t>
<artwork>
<![CDATA[
Type name: application
Subtype name: rpki-aspa
Required parameters: N/A
Optional parameters: N/A
Encoding considerations: binary
Security considerations: Carries an RPKI ASPA [RFC-to-be].
This media type contains no active content. See
Section 4 of [RFC-to-be] for further information.
Interoperability considerations: None
Published specification: [RFC-to-be]
Applications that use this media type: RPKI operators
Additional information:
Content: This media type is a signed object, as defined
in [RFC6488], which contains a payload of a list of
AS identifers as defined in [RFC-to-be].
Magic number(s): None
File extension(s): .asa
Macintosh file type code(s):
Person & email address to contact for further information:
Job Snijders <[email protected]>
Intended usage: COMMON
Restrictions on usage: None
Change controller: IETF
]]>
</artwork>
</section>
</section>
<section anchor="Implementation" title="Implementation Considerations">
<t>
While the ASN.1 profile specified in <xref target="content"/> imposes no limit on the number of Provider ASes that can be listed for a given Customer ASID, consideration will need to be given to limitations existing in validators and elsewhere in the RPKI supply chain.
For example, the number of Provider ASes that can be listed in a single RPKI-To-Router protocol ASPA PDU (<xref target="I-D.ietf-sidrops-8210bis" section="5.12"/>) is constrained to be 2^30-12.
In addition to protocol limitations in the supply chain, locally defined restrictions could exist for the maximum file size a Relying Party implementation is willing to accept for a signed object.
</t>
<t>
Relying Party implementations are RECOMMENDED to impose an upper bound on the number of Provider ASes for a given Customer ASID.
An upper bound value between 4,000 and 10,000 Provider ASes is suggested.
If this threshold is exceeded, Relying Party implementations SHOULD treat all ASPA objects related to the Customer ASID invalid; e.g. not emit a partial list of Provider ASes.
Additionally, an error SHOULD be logged in the local system, indicating the Customer ASID for which the threshold was exceeded.
</t>
<t>
Implementers and operators SHOULD periodically review whether imposed upper bounds still are reasonable in context of the global Internet routing system.
</t>
</section>
<section anchor="Security" title="Security Considerations">
<t>
The security considerations of <xref target="RFC6481"/>, <xref target="RFC6485"/>, and <xref target="RFC6488"/> also apply to ASPAs.
</t>
</section>
<section removeInRFC="true">
<name>Implementation status</name>
<t>
This section records the status of known implementations of the protocol defined by this specification at the time of posting of this Internet-Draft, and is based on a proposal described in RFC 7942.
The description of implementations in this section is intended to assist the IETF in its decision processes in progressing drafts to RFCs.
Please note that the listing of any individual implementation here does not imply endorsement by the IETF.
Furthermore, no effort has been spent to verify the information presented here that was supplied by IETF contributors.
This is not intended as, and must not be construed to be, a catalog of available implementations or their features.
Readers are advised to note that other implementations may exist.
</t>
<t>
According to RFC 7942, "this will allow reviewers and working groups to assign due consideration to documents that have the benefit of running code, which may serve as evidence of valuable experimentation and feedback that have made the implemented protocols more mature.
It is up to the individual working groups to use this information as they see fit".
</t>
<ul>
<li>
A validator implementation <xref target="rpki-client"/> (version 8.5 and higher), written in C was provided by Job Snijders from Fastly.
</li>
<li>
A validator implementation <xref target="routinator"/>, written in Rust was provided by Martin Hoffman from NLnet Labs.
</li>
<li>
A validator implementation <xref target="rpki-prover"/>, written in Haskell was provided by Mikhail Puzanov.
</li>
<li>
A Signer implementation <xref target="rpki-aspa-demo"/> in Perl was reported on Tom Harrison from APNIC.
</li>
<li>
A signer implementation <xref target="rpki-commons"/> in Java was reported on by Ties de Kock from RIPE NCC.
</li>
<li>
A signer implementation <xref target="krill"/> in Rust was reported on by Tim Bruijnzeels from NLnet Labs.
</li>
</ul>
</section>
<section anchor="Acknowledgments" title="Acknowledgments">
<t>
The authors would like to thank Keyur Patel for helping kick-start the ASPA profile project,
Ties de Kock & Tim Bruijnzeels for suggesting that the ProviderASSet be in a canonical form,
and Claudio Jeker & Martin Hoffman for review and several suggestions for improvements.
</t>
</section>
<section title="Contributors" numbered="no">
<t>
The following people made significant contributions to this document:
</t>
<figure><artwork>
<![CDATA[
Kotikalapudi Sriram
USA National Institute of Standards and Technology
Email: [email protected]
]]>
</artwork></figure>
</section>
</middle>
<back>
<references title="Normative References">
<?rfc include="reference.RFC.2119.xml"?>
<?rfc include="reference.RFC.3779.xml"?>
<?rfc include="reference.RFC.5652.xml"?>
<?rfc include="reference.RFC.6481.xml"?>
<?rfc include="reference.RFC.6485.xml"?>
<?rfc include="reference.RFC.6488.xml"?>
<?rfc include="reference.RFC.8174.xml"?>
<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml3/reference.I-D.ietf-sidrops-aspa-verification.xml"/>
<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml3/reference.I-D.ietf-sidrops-8210bis.xml"/>
<reference anchor="X.680">
<front>
<title>Information technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1): Specification of basic notation</title>
<author>
<organization>ITU-T</organization>
</author>
<date year="2021"/>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="ITU-T" value="Recommendation X.680"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="X.690">
<front>
<title>Information Technology - ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)</title>
<author>
<organization>ITU-T</organization>
</author>
<date year="2021"/>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="ITU-T" value="Recommendation X.690"/>
</reference>
</references>
<references title="Informative References">
<?rfc include="reference.RFC.4648.xml"?>
<?rfc include="reference.RFC.6480.xml"?>
<?rfc include="reference.RFC.7947.xml"?>
<reference anchor="rpki-client" target="https://marc.info/?l=openbsd-tech&m=168614057916956&w=2">
<front>
<title>rpki-client</title>
<author initials="J." surname="Snijders">
<organization>Fastly</organization>
</author>
<date year="2023"/>
</front>
</reference>
<reference anchor="rpki-aspa-demo" target="https://github.com/APNIC-net/rpki-aspa-demo">
<front>
<title>rpki-aspa-demo</title>
<author initials="T." surname="Harrison">
<organization>APNIC</organization>
</author>
<date year="2023"/>
</front>
</reference>
<reference anchor="rpki-commons" target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/sidrops/nNAmZMrr7t9NMzm12jRXU03ABN4/">
<front>
<title>rpki-commons</title>
<author initials="T." surname="de Kock">
<organization>RIPE NCC</organization>
</author>
<date year="2023"/>
</front>
</reference>
<reference anchor="krill" target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/sidrops/RrHCYTmevxDHgebdLC_adRlKH-o/">
<front>
<title>krill</title>
<author initials="T." surname="Bruijnzeels">
<organization>NLnet Labs</organization>
</author>
<date year="2023"/>
</front>
</reference>
<reference anchor="rpki-prover" target="https://github.com/lolepezy/rpki-prover/compare/master...aspa-profile-16">
<front>
<title>rpki-prover</title>
<author initials="M." surname="Puzanov"/>
<date year="2023"/>
</front>
</reference>
<reference anchor="routinator" target="https://github.com/NLnetLabs/rpki-rs/pull/264">
<front>
<title>routinator</title>
<author initials="M." surname="Hoffman">
<organization>NLnet Labs</organization>
</author>
<date year="2023"/>
</front>
</reference>
</references>
<section anchor="example">
<name>Example ASPA eContent Payload</name>
<t>
Below an example of a DER encoded ASPA eContent is provided with annotation following the '#' character.
</t>
<artwork>
<![CDATA[
$ echo 301da00302010102023cca301202020b620202205b020300c790020303259e \
| xxd -r -ps | openssl asn1parse -inform DER -dump -i
0:d=0 hl=2 l= 29 cons: SEQUENCE
2:d=1 hl=2 l= 3 cons: cont [ 0 ]
4:d=2 hl=2 l= 1 prim: INTEGER :01
7:d=1 hl=2 l= 2 prim: INTEGER :3CCA # Customer ASID 15562
11:d=1 hl=2 l= 18 cons: SEQUENCE
13:d=2 hl=2 l= 2 prim: INTEGER :0B62 # ProviderAS 2914
17:d=2 hl=2 l= 2 prim: INTEGER :205B # ProviderAS 8283
21:d=2 hl=2 l= 3 prim: INTEGER :C790 # ProviderAS 51088
26:d=2 hl=2 l= 3 prim: INTEGER :03259E # ProviderAS 206238
]]>
</artwork>
<t>
Below is a complete <xref target="RFC4648">Base64</xref> encoded RPKI ASPA Signed Object.
</t>
<artwork>
<![CDATA[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b2Uuc29ib3Jub3N0Lm5ldC9ycGtpL1JJUEUtbmxqb2JzbmlqZGVycy95cWdGMjZ3MlIwbTVz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]]>
</artwork>
<t>
The above should decode as following:
</t>
<artwork>
<![CDATA[
Object SHA256 hash: s25yLaks3OXBzJcW3ZgvlLDiPUpyZbQk2jDHaPDgn1w=
EE Subject key identifier: E6:6F:34:7F:06:30:B3:FD:C5:88:50:FB:26:24:23:02:A6:75:45:84
EE Certificate issuer: /CN=caa805dbac364749b9b115590ab6ef0f970cdbd8
EE Certificate serial: A1C7752FF8B1D2E01F
EE Authority key identifier: CA:A8:05:DB:AC:36:47:49:B9:B1:15:59:0A:B6:EF:0F:97:0C:DB:D8
EE Authority info access: rsync://rpki.ripe.net/repository/DEFAULT/yqgF26w2R0m5sRVZCrbvD5cM29g.cer
EE Subject info access: rsync://chloe.sobornost.net/rpki/RIPE-nljobsnijders/5m80fwYws_3FiFD7JiQjAqZ1RYQ.asa
CMS Signing time: Wed 07 Jun 2023 09:08:41 +0000
EE notBefore: Wed 07 Jun 2023 09:08:14 +0000
EE notAfter: Thu 06 Jun 2024 09:08:14 +0000
ASPA eContent:
Customer AS: 15562
Provider Set: 1: AS: 2914
2: AS: 8283
3: AS: 51088
4: AS: 206238
]]>
</artwork>
</section>
</back>
</rfc>